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HISTORY REDUX:  THE UNHEARD VOICES OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS, A COMMENT 
ON AVIVA ORENSTEIN’S SEX, THREATS AND 
ABSENT VICTIMS 
Myrna S. Raeder* 
 
Despite the optimistic belief that times have changed and that the 
battered womens’ shelter movement1 and the massive influx of $4 billion in 
VAWA funding over the past fifteen2 years has had a significant impact on 
the fight against domestic violence, it takes an article like Professor 
Orenstein’s3 to remind us that courts are still stuck in the past.  Both the 
Confrontation Clause originalism of 1791 favored by Justice Scalia in 
Davis v. Washington4 and Giles v. California5 and the hearsay 
interpretation of the 1879 Bedingfield case analyzed by Professor Orenstein 
result in death permanently silencing women killed by their intimates inside 
as well as outside the courtroom, even when someone who has previously 
heard their voices is available to testify.  As I have argued elsewhere, the 
dynamic nature of domestic violence should work in favor of admitting the 
victim’s testimony in either an emergency or reliability based doctrinal 
regime.6  Instead, courts ignore context and, while claiming domestic 
violence should follow the same rules as other cases, place femicide victims 
in a separate category that does not benefit from relaxed admissibility 
standards governing other emergencies. 
 
*  Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. 
 1. See Myrna S. Raeder, Cultural Shifts:  Addressing [Un]intended Consequences of 
the Fight Against Domestic Violence, 30 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 124 (2011) (providing general 
background about the movement and its impact). 
 2. Office of Violence Against Women, Violence Against Women Act Overview, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/overview.htm (last visited April 29, 
2011). 
 3. Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims:  The Lessons of Regina v. 
Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
115 (2011). 
 4. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 5. 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 6. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Being Heard After Giles:  Comments on The Sound of 
Silence, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 105, 111–13 (2009) [hereinafter After Giles]; Myrna S. 
Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After Davis:  Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 15 
J.L. & POL’Y 759, 774–66 (2007) [hereinafter After Davis]; Myrna S. Raeder, People v. 
Simpson:  Perspectives on the Implications for the Criminal Justice System:  The 
Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence:  Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1463, 1512–16 (1996) [hereinafter Simpson and Beyond] (pre-Crawford). 
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Sex, Threats and Absent Victims aptly opens with the voice of the victim, 
Eliza Rudd, whose throat had just been slashed:  “Oh, aunt, see what 
Bedingfield has done to me.”7 To say that this chilling rebuke is all too 
typical of the voices of women who remain unheard in the courtroom is not 
an exaggeration.  Many of the women who are killed by their intimates 
have identified their abusers either at the time of their death or in relation to 
previous incidents of abuse.  As Professor Orenstein relates the events, 
Bedingfield was complicated by the fact that the defendant’s own throat was 
also cut and at trial he claimed that the victim attempted to kill him before 
killing herself.8  The decedent’s statement was rejected at trial as not fitting 
any hearsay exception because it did not occur at the very time her throat 
was slashed, but the defendant was convicted based on other evidence.9  
Bedingfield was not a classic domestic violence case:  the defendant was 
married to someone else, though it was undisputed he had a sexual 
relationship with Rudd, and had previously threatened her, but the final 
dispute regarded the use of a pony and cart.10  Indeed, in modern parlance 
this may have been more a function of situational violence rather than 
coercive control.11  Yet, even here the case is clouded because a witness 
claimed the defendant’s threats the night before her death were in the 
classic vein of “If I can’t have you nobody can.”12  The defendant claimed 
the death was a result of the victim’s jealous rage when he told her he had 
impregnated someone else, and steadfastly maintained his innocence.13  
Many apparently believed his claim and signed a petition unsuccessfully 
requesting commutation of his death penalty,14 in part because they 
believed that while the victim’s dying statement had not been admitted, it 
was widely known.15  Professor Orenstein finds support for the verdict in 
the medical evidence, though ironically she questions whether Rudd ever 
uttered the words that were excluded given the medical evidence regarding 
the condition of her throat.16 
Bedingfield is used as the starting point to critique the res gestae 
exception to hearsay then in effect in England.  Orenstein goes on to 
describe how Americans considered the decision as taking an overly narrow 
view of how contemporaneous a statement had to be to justify its 
admission.17  Evidence luminaries Wigmore and Thayer both rejected the 
Bedingfield limitation, albeit for different reasons, and res gestae morphed 
 
 7. Orenstein, supra note 3, at 116. 
 8. Id. at 117. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id at 121–22. 
 11. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 1, at 140–41. 
 12. See Orenstein, supra note 3, at 125 (describing the defendant’s jealousy, noting that 
Bedingfield reportedly said, “‘Before you shall have anybody come here in my place I’ll cut 
your —— throat.’” (quoting The Ipswich Tragedy, IPSWICH J., Sept. 20, 1879, at 7, available 
at Gale, Doc. No. Y3202579060)). 
 13. Id. at 122. 
 14. Id. at 123. 
 15. Id. at 124 
 16. Id. at 125–26. 
 17. Id. at 131. 
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into excited utterances and eventually included present sense impressions.18  
Orenstein points out that the very statement rejected in Bedingfield still 
poses “significant problems for modern confrontation doctrine”19 in 
domestic violence cases, which after Davis focuses on whether the 
statement addresses an ongoing emergency as opposed to relating past facts 
for prosecution.20  She then turns to Giles, addressing forfeiture in a 
domestic violence context, which the court found required an intent to 
procure the declarant’s absence in order to prevent the witness from 
testifying.21 
The article is rich in detail about how the feminist agenda switched 
domestic violence from a social to a criminal issue, but had difficulty 
overcoming patriarchal attitudes or the reluctance of women to testify.22  
Like her, I have commented on the fallout of our domestic violence policies 
that she highlights in the article.23  These include the multitude of reasons 
that may result in women refusing to testify against their intimates, ranging 
from love to fear of either personal injury or of losing children to foster 
care, to embarrassment or economic reality; the inability of the criminal 
justice system to keep women and their children safe, in large measure 
because the typical outcome is a misdemeanor prosecution that may not 
even keep her abuser in jail for very long, while often diminishing his 
ability to get or keep a job; the mixed results from mandatory arrest and no 
drop policies, which have swelled the number of women as well as men 
caught up in the criminal justice system; the difficulty that Crawford v. 
Washington24 and Davis has posed in prosecutions of batterers when 
women do not appear at trial; and the failure of Giles to provide an easy 
solution to the so-called “victimless” evidence based prosecutions that 
depend on hearsay to identify the defendant. 
Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims makes a valuable contribution to the 
literature by revealing that the language used in Bedingfield’s res gestae 
analysis dovetails with Davis’s view of emergencies in that both are “in the 
moment” and ignore the dynamics of domestic violence which implicate a 
process rather than a finite event.  Shortly after Crawford, I had predicted 
that courts might pull back on their expansive definitions of excited 
utterances since they evolved well after the adoption of the Constitution, 
and in an originalist approach, might prove more likely to be testimonial.25  
I based this on Justice Scalia’s reference in Crawford to the fact that in 
 
 18. Id. at 133. 
 19. Id. at 134. 
 20. Id. at 135–40. 
 21. Id. at 141. 
 22. Id. at 144. 
 23. See generally After Giles, supra note 6; After Davis, supra note 6; Raeder, supra 
note 1; Myrna S. Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too:  Crawford’s Impact 
on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BKLYN L. REV. 311 (2005) [hereinafter 
Remember the Ladies]; Simpson and Beyond, supra note 6; Myrna S. Raeder, Thoughts 
about Giles and Forfeiture in Domestic Violence Cases, 75 BKLYN L. REV. 1329 (2010) 
[hereinafter Giles and Forfeiture]. 
 24. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 25. Remember the Ladies, supra note 23, at 323–24. 
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1791, excited utterances were interpreted very narrowly as applying to res 
gestae, but not to after the fact descriptions,26 and the decision of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court to cut back its interpretation of the excited utterance 
exception in light of the new constitutional regime.27  Professor Orenstein 
observes that the timing approach has not worked for women in either the 
hearsay or confrontation context.  To me, however, there are differences.  
Overall, I believe we have expanded hearsay exceptions unduly, devaluing 
cross-examination.  While I would not return to a pre-Bedingfield view of 
res gestae, I would keep excited utterances confined to immediately 
surrounding circumstances, since I think that stress no longer eliminates the 
risk of fabrication once we get beyond the ten to fifteen minute range, or the 
responses are in answer to even gentle police questioning.  In other words, 
some indication of trustworthiness beyond the rationale of excitement 
seems necessary to support a theory of admissibility. 
Interestingly, Michigan v. Bryant,28 the U.S. Supreme Court’s latest 
foray into what I have dubbed “testimonialism,”29 interjects reliability and 
hearsay analysis back into the Confrontation Clause mix by noting that “[i]n 
making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, 
designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”30  
Similarly, Bryant cites Davis as implying that the likelihood of fabrication 
is “significantly diminished” for statements made with the primary purpose 
of resolving an emergency.31  Bryant compares the rationale that excited 
utterances given under stress eliminate the possibility of fabrication to the 
fact that ongoing emergencies focus attention on the emergency and away 
from the use of such statements in a prosecution.32 
This approach is curious because Davis clearly found that excited 
utterances had to be analyzed individually, and not as a category for 
Confrontation Clause purposes.  In Davis and its companion case, Hammon 
v. Indiana,33 both defendants appealed their convictions on the grounds that 
the statements admitted against them violated the Confrontation Clause— 
Davis argued that the victim’s statements to a 911 operator were testimonial 
and Hammon argued that the victim’s statements to a police officer 
memorialized in her affidavit were testimonial.34  Davis split the baby, 
holding the statements introduced against Davis were nontestimonial, while 
those introduced against Hammon were testimonial.  Is Bryant offering a 
nuanced suggestion that true excited utterances, i.e., res gestae should be 
viewed as more likely to be nontestimonial? Such an approach would be 
helpful in some domestic violence cases.  Indeed, a long seemingly 
 
 26. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. 
 27. State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 673, 690 (N.J. 2005). 
 28. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 29. See, e.g., Giles and Forfeiture, supra note 23, at 1337. 
 30. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1155. 
 31. Id. at 1157. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 34. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817, 819 (2006). 
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gratuitous footnote in Bryant indicates a number of other hearsay 
exceptions that appear to have purposes other than prosecution.35  Again, 
the citation for this proposition is somewhat odd since the Court references 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts in support of business and public records, 
despite its holding that a sworn certificate indicating drug quantity was not 
a “traditional” record,36 which again indicates that distinctions must be 
made that go beyond simple nomenclature. 
While Bryant does not overtly cut away at Davis’s rejection of any 
substantive reliability test for nontestimonial hearsay, these references 
appear to surface reliability as a positive substantive value beyond the 
functional right of cross-examination that Crawford and Davis tells us is all 
the Confrontation Clause requires.  This is particularly noticeable since the 
Court makes its first Crawford era reference to Idaho v. Wright,37 a case 
that rejected a child’s statement to a pediatrician admitted under a residual 
exception, which in the modern regime poses problems because it is either a 
nontestimonial statement (because given to a private individual) that was 
rejected because it was unreliable, or a testimonial statement given to a 
private individual, unless the doctor is recharacterized as an agent of the 
police.  If the former, its holding could still be justified on Due Process 
grounds, a route that is suggested in a footnote in which Bryant specifically 
resurrects the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
as alternative means of challenging the admissibility of unreliable 
evidence,38 a view I have long held. 
It is obvious that I have never been a fan of testimonialism, and agree 
with Professor Orenstein that the Court has demonstrated an undue 
insensitivity to the context of domestic violence.39  The cues that 
Hammon’s wife, Amy Hammon, was still in danger permeated the facts 
described in the decision.  Her fear, her husband’s interruptions, her 
statements about his breaking the phone and disabling her van were classic 
identifiers that suggested a pattern of coercive control or in current 
Confrontation Clause parlance signaled a continuing emergency.  While 
coercive control of victims does not mean emergencies should never end in 
the domestic violence arena, it indicates why I think the current definition 
of emergencies doesn’t fit with what we know about the dynamics of most 
domestic violence cases.  This approach makes no reasonable distinction 
between what we now classify as constitutionally acceptable or 
unacceptable, thus disadvantaging victims, but also lessening respect for the 
criminal justice system. 
I had hoped that when someone other than Justice Scalia would be called 
upon to write a majority decision in a case defining emergencies, this 
disconnect might be addressed.  I therefore find it ironic that although 
 
 35. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1157 n.9. 
 36. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2009). 
 37. 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (cited by Bryant for the rationale concerning excited utterances. 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157). 
 38. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1162 n.13. 
 39. Orenstein, supra note 3, at 150, 152. 
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Justice Sotomayor authored the decision in Bryant,40 which broadly 
construed a medical emergency when the assailant had fled and the victim 
lay bleeding from a gunshot wound in a public place, the applicable 
analysis still disfavors battered women.  Justice Sotomayor, herself a 
former prosecutor, faults the Michigan court for ignoring that “whether an 
emergency exists and is ongoing is a highly context-dependent inquiry,”41 
thereby downplaying Justice Scalia’s dismissive view that domestic 
violence could not be subject to separate Confrontation Clause rules.42  She 
writes:  “[a]s the context of this case brings into sharp relief, the existence 
and duration of an emergency depend on the type and scope of danger 
posed to the victim, the police, and the public.”43 
Despite her reliance on context, the opinion restates the Davis findings, 
and its analysis that domestic violence involves a “known and identified 
perpetrator”44 and a “narrower zone of potential victims than cases 
involving threats to public safety”45 makes it more likely that emergencies 
implicating domestic violence will be confined to the particular time and 
place of the incident.  For example, Bryant explains that in Davis “we 
focused only on the threat to the victims and assessed the ongoing 
emergency from the perspective of whether there was a continuing threat to 
them.”46  In other words, there is no “public” dimension to the crime which 
might suggest the threat of an ongoing emergency that could involve risk to 
additional individuals by an unknown assailant resulting in the statements 
being considered nontestimonial.47  Thus, the Court differentiated the 
nature of the emergency in Bryant because it “extends beyond an initial 
victim to a potential threat to the responding police and the public at 
large.”48 
Bryant also relied on the fact that a gun was used as indicating a 
continuing threat even though the assailant had fled.49  Because virtually all 
domestic violence misdemeanors and many domestic violence felonies do 
not involve the use of guns, this too may justify a narrower definition of 
emergency in domestic violence cases.  Thus, the dynamic nature of 
domestic violence still appears to be ignored in evaluating emergencies, and 
the facts that are common to domestic violence cases now have been 
characterized in a way that obviates their contribution to an ongoing 
emergency.  Of course, in determining constitutionality, the emergency is 
only the starting point, since the focus is whether the primary purpose of the 
statement is to assist in an ongoing emergency as opposed to reporting a 
 
 40. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1143. 
 41. Id. at 1158. 
 42. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 374 (2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 
832–33 (2006). 
 43. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162. 
 44. Id. at 1158. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1158. 
 47. Id. at 1156. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1164. 
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past event.  But Bryant does not overtly back away from Davis, thereby 
reinforcing the likelihood that many statements made to the police in 
domestic violence situations will be testimonial, though it reiterates that 
informality is a factor favoring a statement being found nontestimonial,50 
which is often argued by prosecutors. 
Bryant’s clarification that statements must be considered from both the 
perspective of the declarant and the interrogator also appears likely to favor 
statements being found testimonial in domestic violence settings, since it 
means that there are two hoops to jump through before a finding of 
nontestimoniality.  In addition, Bryant reaffirms the objective standard.51  
Professor Orenstein explains that an objective standard is not necessarily 
friendly to battered women52 whose subjective cries for help in situations 
they know will reoccur may be viewed objectively as reports of past finite 
incidents, requested by police who want to solve crimes.  In my view, 
however, an objective standard is probably easier to prove than a subjective 
one when deciding intent in cases where forfeiture is based on the failure of 
complainants to appear at trial since the mixed motives of uncooperative 
witnesses complicate the analysis. 
Even in a testimonial approach, many statements of absent domestic 
violence declarants should lend themselves to admission by forfeiture 
analysis.  Yet Giles’s focus on intention to keep the victim from testifying 
does limit the likelihood of admitting such testimony.  I am not 
uncomfortable with this result when the conduct is a misdemeanor and the 
complainant not only is alive, but also indicates by words or conduct that 
she does not want to press charges.  As I have written elsewhere, I think the 
complainant’s wishes should be respected in most misdemeanor and some 
felony cases that do not involve “risky” offenders who have demonstrated a 
pattern of abuse.53  In other words, in most misdemeanors, women should 
be able to access the police to stop the violence without buying into a 
criminal justice system response that has the potential of worsening their 
lives and the lives of their children without an assurance of safety. 
Professor Orenstein finds favor with Professor Tom Lininger’s approach 
to forfeiture54 which would find intent “where the defendant has violated a 
restraining order, committed any act of violence while judicial proceedings 
are pending, or engaged in a prolonged pattern of abusing and isolating the 
victim.”55  In my previous comments on his article,56 I too was impressed 
with his solutions, while suggesting that his rules be considered as 
rebuttable presumptions57 and adding some additional types of evidence as 
supporting forfeiture, such as the existence of a protective order rather than 
 
 50. Id. at 1160. 
 51. Id. at 1156. 
 52. Orenstein, supra note 3 at 152. 
 53. Raeder, supra note 1, at 144–46; Remember the Ladies, supra note 23, at 367–73. 
 54. Orenstein, supra note 3, at 157–58. 
 55. Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence:  Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing 
Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 865 (2009). 
 56. After Giles, supra note 6. 
 57. Id. at 110. 
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its violation.  For example, in murder prosecutions the killing itself would 
violate the order, while in other domestic violence prosecutions obtaining 
the order gives the defendant notice of potential legal consequences and 
triggers behaviors such as isolating the victim, associated with the goal of 
coercive control.58  As I have also argued, proof that the defendant has an 
abusive personality, and proof that the decedent suffered from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder should also be considered in the intent analysis 
since the forfeiture issues are preliminary facts for the judge and therefore 
are not subject to the rules of evidence which would prohibit character from 
being considered by jurors.59 
When the victim’s voice is silenced by death, I view the question of 
forfeiture differently than in other domestic violence cases.  Pre-Giles I 
argued for a standard that did not require intent to keep the witness from 
testifying.60  Like Professor Orenstein, I have written that when 
unavailability is a product of death rather than lack of cooperation with the 
authorities, the ambiguities surrounding their silence disappear and I agree 
that Giles’s view of forfeiture is too narrow.  However, I have discussed 
elsewhere that while Giles ostensibly handed prosecutors and victims’ 
advocates a defeat, reworking the votes obtains a supermajority for inferred 
intent in domestic violence murder cases, and at least a simple majority 
composed of the concurrers and dissenters for inferred intent all domestic 
violence cases.61  After Giles, I also think flight should prompt a finding of 
forfeiture since it can be inferred that if the perpetrator flees, he is impeding 
the integrity of the judicial process, and intends to hinder justice.62 
Elsewhere, I have also argued that beyond forfeiture, the defense opens 
the door to evidence that indicates the state of mind of a decedent when the 
defense is based on claims of suicide, accident, or self-defense.63  In other 
words, trial strategy should be viewed as waiving any Confrontation Clause 
challenge concerning otherwise admissible evidence that rebuts the 
defendant’s testimony about the decedent’s state of mind.  Thus, the 
statement to the victim’s aunt in Bedingfield should have been admitted 
because it indicates that she was not likely to have attempted to kill the 
defendant, which makes her state of mind relevant to his theory of the case.  
Domestic violence prosecutions have been set back by the testimonial 




 58. Id. at 109–10. 
 59. Id. at 111–13. 
 60. Remember the Ladies, supra note 23, at 361–65. 
 61. Giles and Forfeiture, supra note 23, at 1345–46. 
 62. After Giles, supra note 6, at 109–10. 
 63. Giles and Forfeiture, supra note 23, at 1341–43. 
